Tuesday, July 1, 2014

Singular Modernisms and the Problem of Universalism




Irmeli Hautamäki, Ph.D.
University of Helsinki
A paper presented in the BAMS conference Modernism Now! in London 28.6. 2014.

Adorno has considered the problematical relation between the special and general in art in his unfinished Aesthetic Theory. Art has always attempted to rescue the special, he says, progressive particularization has been immanent to it. Successful art works have been those in which specification has flourished. In aesthetics there is an oppositional tendency to develop general concepts which describe genres, types, styles and aesthetic value. It is, however questionable, Adorno points whether these generalizing concepts correspond what is crucial in the works. On the other hand, it is as problematical, how can art and art criticism manage without such general notions.

Adorno outlined the tension between particular and universal as a dilemma between nominalism and universalism. What he termed nominalism or a nominalistic tendency in modern art means the historical advance of numerous specialized art forms which do not share common characteristics as art in general or as a genre. From the point of view of aesthetic theory the multiplying of modernisms is a contingent and uncontrolled process. It means that, “the universal is no longer granted in art through new types and the older types have drawn into whirlpool”. The nominalistic tendency which has strengthened in modernist art is not a new thing; according to Adorno it was Benedetto Croce who raised this tendency to the level of theoretical aesthetics by suggesting, “that every work should be judged, as the English say, on its own merits”. While it is true, that probably no important artwork has ever corresponded completely to its genre, it is a shame that Croce, who dismissed the genres, diluted the element of universality in art, says Adorno.  Croce did not seriously undertake to transcend the notion of genre, Adorno objects (AT, 199).

Today the opposition between the special and general has led to a situation where the practices and theory of art have completely torn apart. There are no more general aesthetic concepts which could be used in description, reception and evaluation of art; no one seems to miss such general concepts, but without them, art remains inconceivable. Adorno complained already in the 1960s that it was awkward that “aesthetics was compelled to drag its concepts helplessly behind a situation of art” in which radical art sought to undermine those concepts (AT, 339). Since that radical contemporary art has been looking for the borders of art and attempted to transgress them, indifferent to the consequences.  What is awkward today is that contemporary art has come to a situation where it is forced to defend itself against the attacks of the cultural conservatives who completely condemn modern art (or the so-called post-modern art). Without convincing general concepts or a theory of modern art both contemporary art and its defenders find themselves helpless in front of the conservative critique.

Adorno, who was concerned about the situation already in the 60’s, did not, however, reproach modern art. The problem was according to him in aesthetic theory, which in the modern era had become hopelessly backward. It was inevitable that the classical aesthetic theories of Kant and Hegel were obsolete. Kant and Hegel could develop their aesthetic theories in terms of their philosophical systems without a touch to the practices of art. In their time it was possible to develop general aesthetics which “scarcely ever confronted itself with its object”, says Adorno (AT, 333).  He continues that, “Hegel and Kant were the last who, to put it bluntly, were able to develop major aesthetics without understanding anything about art” (AT, 334).

It is well known, for example, that Kant did not say anything about art in his aesthetics. The experience of sublime is related to nature whereas the notion of beauty is connected to imagination and its capability to play with forms. The Kantian concept of taste: the aesthetic distancing is completely incompatible with progressive modern art such as Kafka in which the secure aesthetic distance to the object is undermined (AT, 339). Hegel’s aesthetics had more progressive elements than Kant’s but Hegel did not reach the modernity. Most importantly, what makes Hegel’s aesthetics obsolete is its commitment to the old form/content distinction, which refers to classical representational art.

As a consequence, Adorno outspokenly proposes the elucidated and concrete dissolution of traditional aesthetic categories – such as taste and aesthetic value – it is the  only remaining form that aesthetics can take today (AT, 341). It must be replaced with a modern aesthetics which has understanding of what is immanent in art, what is inherent in its practices. The development of modern aesthetics presupposes that it is constituted from below, which means that theoreticians should learn from the artists. At the same time the artists should become reflective, they should consider their practices and methods conceptually (AT, 343).

Adorno outlined some characteristics of modern aesthetics in his Aesthetic Theory. The most important of them is what he called the open form of an artwork. The open form is thus a modern aesthetic concept – or a proposition for such ­– which replaces the traditional concept of form (the unity of form and content) in classical aesthetics. 

“Open forms are those universal genre categories that seek equilibrium with the nominalistic critique of universality”. An open form of a particular artwork means that it does not completely fulfill the characteristics of a general style or a genre but contains some contingency, some deviation from it. The classical Viennese sonata form was a typical closed form, but its closure was precarious, because the rondo part in the sonata was open, Adorno explains (AT, 220). Thus even in classical works there is some openness of form, especially in music.

The social or political characteristics that Adorno connects to the open form are worth noticing. “The liberation of form, which genuinely new art desires, holds within it above all the liberation of society, for form – the social nexus of everything particular – represents the social relation in the artwork; this is why liberated form is an anathema to status quo” (AT, 255).  The liberation of form is related to the freedom of society and the emancipation of the subject and his or her experience – while the closed form (the strict unity with form and content) corresponds with the conservative, hierarchic society.  Adorno also considers the open forms in psychological terms pointing out that an authoritarian personality has difficulties to stand the open form or any contingent elements in an artwork.  The liberation of form is possible only in a social context which also guarantees the freedom of an individual. 

Though Adorno welcomes the liberation of form he does not embrace techniques which produce chance. As examples of this he mentions Action painting, l’ art informelle (informalism) and aleatorical works, which were new artistic practices in the 60’s. Adorno comments some what bitterly that in artworks which rely on chance “the aesthetic subject exempts itself from the burden of giving form to the contingent material it encounters and instead shifts the responsibility for its organization back to the contingent material” (AT, 221). Adorno considers the aesthetic “gain” of this kind of art dubious. He means that such nominalistic art works need the guiding hand – of form.

Today Adorno’s doubt of the chance producing techniques in art may sound backward and even intolerant. Yet there is a point in this doubt. Though it has been correctly pointed by recent authors like Tyrus Miller, for instance, that art works which use chance producing techniques, such as John Cage’s compositions or Marcel Duchamp’s ready-made works, help to emancipate the subject, there is a reservation that must be made.[1]  Namely there is a danger that these experiences fragment without the shared (general) signifying concepts. The emancipation of the subject thus obtained concerns only to isolated individuals. It remains unattainable in general, political level.

To conclude: the opposition between singularity and universalism does not find a solution in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory. Adorno’s attempt to reconcile singularity and universal remains obscure and seems to refer to Platonism. The genres in Adorno’s sense refer to platonic ideas and at the same time they are claimed to be historical, which is a contradiction. In Adorno the attempt to formulate general concepts leads either to essentialism, which is at odds with (modern) art, or to another extreme: nominalism or singularity wherein art has been liberated from all general characteristics.

As a solution to the contradictory relation between essentialism and nominalism I would like propose conceptualism.[2] In conceptualism the essential characteristics that transcend time and place are not accepted; but the relevance of general concepts are not denied altogether.  According to conceptualism in all singular phenomena there are some common characteristics, and on this basis it is possible to create a general concept to describe these phenomena. The classification of phenomena and conceptualization can be done in different ways depending on which characteristic is emphasized. For a conceptualist the meanings of concepts are necessarily historical; they do not have meanings that transcend time and place.

As a matter of fact a theoretician who attempts to develop modern aesthetics should proceed toward conceptualism. He or she should describe singular examples, works and their immanent artistic methods and from this basis search common characteristics which allow to classify them conceptually.  This method does not, however, prevent the possibility that the genres and concepts thus obtained will not become norms in art. Because, as Adorno says, art does not need aesthetics that will prescribe norms where it (art) finds itself in difficulty, but rather of an aesthetic theory that will provide the capacity of reflection, which art on its own is hardly able to achieve (A, 341).   

References:

Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, University of Minnesota Press, 1997 (1970). 
Tyrus Miller: Singular Examples, Northwestern University Press, 2009.
Ronald N. Giere: Scientific Perspectivism, University of Chicago Press, 2006.




[1] Miller believes that as such artworks “offer the audience unique, one-time and anarchic occasions for experience” they encourage members of the audience to make individual and exceptional choices in their lives and promote variants, deviations and differences as the texture of freedom in society (Singular examples, 10 -11).
[2] For instance Ronald Giere has written on this in his Scientific Perspectivism.